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This paper will examine the pattern of Central Asian migrant workers in Russia becoming 
radicalized and leaving to fight for the Islamic State in Syria. This progression is notable, as few 
Central Asian residents have left from their homelands to Syria directly. Instead, there appears to 
be a combination of push and pull factors driving migrant workers out of Russia and into the arms 
of the Islamic State. Through a historical review of radicalization-related literature and an analysis 
of the social situations unfolding in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, this paper will attempt to 
shed light on why migrants would risk moving to Syria and Iraq. The results of this research 
indicate that Tajik and Uzbek migrants in Russia are uniquely vulnerable to radicalization. A 
combination of authoritarian repression at home, discrimination and marginalization abroad, and 
a potent group of local recruiters, is pushing Uzbeks and Tajiks out of Russia and into terror 
groups. These factors are unlikely to change in the near future, necessitating a serious consideration 
of new policy options to stymie this burgeoning geopolitical security issue.  
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 On April 3, 2017, a bomb exploded in the Saint Petersburg metro, killing 14 and injuring 
more than 50. The perpetrator, Akbarzhon Jalilov, was a Kyrgyz national who had repeatedly 
traveled to Russia for work purposes. It is suspected that Jalilov was radicalized while living in 
Russia and traveled to Turkey and possibly Syria before carrying out his attack. Jalilov’s path to 
radicalization is not uncommon: over the last several years, thousands of Central Asian migrant 
workers in Russia have left to fight for the Islamic State. This paper will bring this phenomenon 
into focus, analyzing the origins and root causes of migrant radicalization in Russia. 
 First, this paper will examine common themes in radicalization-related literature over the 
last thirty years, with specific emphasis on radicalization in Russia and Central Asia. Academic 
research has long been playing catch-up with active geopolitical threats and radicalization 
movements; the literature review covered in Chapter One will highlight both the astute 
observations and critical oversights present in radicalization research over the last decade and a 
half. The second chapter will analyze the push and pull factors of migrant radicalization, 
contextualizing the situation in Russia and Central Asia with a combination of historical analysis 
and societal trends. Through this analysis, the paper will shed light on how the radicalization 
process for migrant workers in Russia differs from radicalized individuals in the West. Finally, the 
third chapter will cover the policy implications of these conclusions and will highlight the severity 







Chapter One:  Literature Review 
SECTION ONE: THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS ON A GENERAL LEVEL 
 Following the 2001 September 11th terror attacks, efforts to study the driving factors behind 
Islamic radicalization have become a prominent component of academic literature.  This first 
section will examine the predominant literature regarding the radicalization process and the 
combination of structural, societal, and personal stress factors that push a person to radicalize.  
 There is considerable debate regarding the nature of the radicalization process. Is 
radicalization a personal issue that develops internally within someone, or does radicalization 
develop more broadly at the collective level?1 Beyond personal psychology, there are varying 
external factors that have influenced people to join jihadi networks and/or carry out terror attacks. 
Factors on a micro level, like direct discrimination based on race or religion, differ from larger 
geopolitical events that galvanize angry feelings and push at-risk individuals towards 
radicalization. Generally, radicalization-related research falls into a subcategory of psychology, 
sociology, or political science. Together, all of these factors work in varying degrees to radicalize 
an individual. 
 Early efforts to psychologically analyze Islamic radicalization were limited, as most of the 
research was forced to focus on open-source reporting rather than personal interviews.2 Literature 
also focused on the “deviant” nature of terrorism, characterizing terrorists as delinquents who were 
psychologically predisposed to distasteful and violent behavior.3 Researchers’ inability to 
interview and directly interact with would-be terrorists exacerbated confirmation and attribution 
                                                          
1 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization,” Politics, Religion, and 
Ideology 13, no. 1 (2012): 105. 
2 Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,” European Journal of 
Criminology 5, no. 1 (2008): 102. 
3 Silke, “Holy Warriors,” 103.  
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biases. For some authors, the extreme nature of terrorist behavior indicated that only extreme and 
disturbed individuals were capable of carrying out such acts. Future research was able to elucidate 
more proximate psychological causes of radicalization, which included feelings of marginalization 
and discrimination, as well as the possibility of rewards and increased status.4 
 Sociologists have also attempted to explain the cause of radicalization beyond 
psychological imbalances and personal stress factors. In addition to direct marginalization and 
discrimination, young second and third-generation Muslim immigrants often struggle with 
identity, occupying a space between cultures.5 Several sociologists have argued that while 
searching for answers, these alienated individuals often “find” militant Islam as an outlet for 
feelings of discord.6 Would-be radicals are able to empathize with the suffering of other Muslims, 
pitting the Muslim community against the United States and its allies, who are perceived as 
perpetrators of violence. Other sociology scholars have argued that individuals are radicalized 
through social movements, and direct exposure to radical individuals or ideas serves as a key 
means of altering one’s views to conform with militant Islam.7  
 Prior to 2001, the term “radicalization” was sometimes used to describe a shift in terrorism 
itself: as the driving ideology of terror groups began to change from primarily political to primarily 
religious, terror attacks also became more violent and indiscriminate.8 In the 1970s, the number of 
terror incidents spiked, as groups like the Baader-Meinhof Group (also known as the Red Army 
Faction) and the Japanese Red Army gained notoriety for terror attacks carried out in the name of 
                                                          
4 Silke, “Holy Warriors,” 115. 
5 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know 
and What We Do Not Know,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33, no. 9 (2010) 800. 
6 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide bombers. Allah’s new martyrs, (London: Pluto Press, 2005): 185. 
7 Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe,” 802. 
8 Walter Laqueur, "Terror's New Face: The Radicalization and Escalation of Modern Terrorism," Harvard 
International Review 20, no. 4 (1998): 48-51. 
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far-left Marxist ideology.9 Both groups were comprised of young, middle class individuals who 
sought to enact violence against the state and ruling classes to bring about popular revolution.10 
Early scholarly insight into these groups utilized interviews with former members to depict a social 
movement that had been pushed towards violence by a select group of individuals in leadership 
positions.11  
Through the 1970s and 1980s, global terror activities were not viewed as being driven by 
Islamic extremism, but rather a tool to further extremist political agendas. The terror groups that 
were inherently Islamic, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hezbollah, 
were more likely to draw upon an existing population already galvanized by political discord. 
Individuals who carried out violent terror attacks did so with the aim of making some type of 
political gains. Here, violence against both the state and civilians was a means rather than an end.  
 In the late 1990s, research into Islamic radicalism and further insights into new forms of 
terrorism began to garner more interest, but prior to 9/11 these two ideas were largely unconnected. 
Research regarding the increasingly radical nature of Islam often focused on sectarian issues and 
how such large divides created localized conflict. Muhammad Qasim Zaman’s research into the 
radicalization of Pakistani religious identity is informative, as he points to a combination of 
economic and religious factors that caused a spike in Sunni-Shia violence in 1990s Pakistan.12 
Although the violence Zaman’s research is not classified as terrorism, the author details a kind of 
                                                          
9 John F. Burns, “Fate of 5 Terrorists Hangs Between Japan and Lebanon,” New York Times, March 17, 2000, 
accessed April 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/17/world/fate-of-5-terrorists-hangs-between-japan-
and-lebanon.html.  
10 Andrew McKirdy, “Imprisoned Japanese Red Army founder Shigenobu holds out hope for revolution,” Japan 
Times, June 8, 2017, accessed March 11, 2018, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/08/national/imprisoned-japanese-red-army-founder-shigenobu-
holds-hope-revolution/#.WpSPRa2grIU.  
11 Horst Mahler, “Birth and Death of the Red Army Faction,” Australian Left Review 1, no. 78 (1981): 47-49.  
12 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi‘i and Sunni Identities," Modern 
Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (1998): 715. 
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proto-radicalization that took place in 1980s Pakistan: local madrassas and clerics sought to sow 
religious discord for political gain, thus inciting their followers to carry out violent attacks in the 
name of their sect (in this case, Sunni or Shia). 
Against this backdrop, it is important to consider two major geopolitical events and their 
ramifications regarding Islam: the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the Soviet war in (and 
subsequent withdrawal from) Afghanistan. The former created a sovereign Shia-dominated state 
in the heart of the Middle East, exacerbating sectarian tension far beyond localized conflict and 
into outright state-to-state animosity, including an eight-year war with Iraq. The latter, meanwhile, 
functioned as an incubator for future jihadists and radical ideological leaders. Taken together, the 
Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War heightened tensions between the Muslim world 
and the West, while also contributing to further ideological divides within the Middle East.13 
 By the end of the 1990s, some scholars had begun to connect recent high-profile terror 
incidents carried out by Islamists against Western targets. They argued that the nature of terrorism 
had shifted, both in terms of scope and ideology.14 Some authors went as far as to warn the West 
that future terror attacks would grow larger in scale and would focus on civilian targets. Osama 
bin Laden’s became a prominent focus in new terrorism literature. bin Laden and Ramzi Yousef, 
the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the failed Bojinka plot, both publicly 
stated their anger with the United States and its foreign policy. Bin Laden criticized US troop 
presence in the Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, while Yousef blamed the US government for 
perpetrating Muslim civilian deaths. Pre-9/11 terrorism literature did not deeply engage in the 
                                                          
13 Peter Tomsen, "Untying the Afghan Knot," Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 25, no. 1 (2001): 21. 




driving factors behind bin Laden and Yousef’s radicalization, but this analysis still serves as a 
viable early look into the changing nature of terrorism. 
 The decade following the September 11th attacks saw a sharp increase in terrorism and 
Islamic radicalization-related research.15 Research in the early years of the War on Terror tended 
to focus primarily on radicalization on a macro level. This is understandable, as little research had 
been done on al Qaeda and other Islamic terror networks. Additionally, there was concern in the 
West that other Islamic movements would spring up in the aftermath of the United States entering 
two wars in the Middle East.16 Given the nature and consequences of terrorist behavior there is 
considerable difficulty even today in interviewing former jihadis to glean a better understanding 
of the radicalization process. This problem was more acute in the early years of the War on Terror, 
given the technological limitations of the time.  
 As literature began to come out focusing on the micro and personal elements of 
radicalization, the research primarily posited radicalization as a process vis a vis hatred of the West 
and its allies.17 Here, radicalization is discussed as something people are pushed towards as a 
consequence of geopolitical actions taken by the United States and its allies. Disaffected youth are 
more easily drawn to extremist groups because of perceived solidarity with the Muslim world: if 
the West is perpetuating the suffering of fellow Muslims, then angry individuals with little else to 
lose are drawn to take up violent action in retribution. The arguments for geopolitics being one of 
the driving factors tended to focus on the radicalization of people in Muslim-majority countries, 
i.e. the Middle East and neighboring regions. Although this research is enlightening, it is somewhat 
                                                          
15 A University of Texas Library online search with of the words “Islamic” and “radicalism” together generates 
9,041 results from 1992-2001, while the same search generates 22,614 results from 2002-2011. 
16 Hasan Mehdi, “Did the invasion of Iraq heighten the threat from al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism?” New Statesman, 
September 16, 2011, accessed April 2, 2018, https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/mehdi-hasan/2011/09/iraq-
qaeda-verdict-terrorism.  
17 Jared Cohen, "Diverting the Radicalization Track," Policy Review no. 154 (April, 2009): 51-63. 
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limited in scope in that it does not necessarily illuminate the reasons for citizens in the United 
States and Europe – ones that have not felt the brunt of geopolitical and/or military force – to leave 
the safety of their home lives for violent jihadi groups. Additionally, too often research does not 
adequately discuss the war within Islam – especially in a geopolitical context – as a catalyst for 
sectarian violence and radicalization. 
 With this framework in mind, research began to focus more specifically on what kinds of 
factors set up an individual to be inclined to radicalize. More substantive research was published 
regarding individuals living in Western countries who were radicalized, and radicalization research 
began to more heavily scrutinize policies designed to counter those individuals.18 The Arab Spring 
movement of 2011 represents a critical juncture in radicalization research. Across North Africa 
and the Middle East, citizens began pressuring authoritarian governments for political reform.19 In 
some ways, this behavior represented a radical shift in political behavior not seen before in the 
Modern Arab world. In the aftermath of the protests, Islamist groups were galvanized by the 
general public’s new interest in political change. In countries like Syria and Libya, civil wars 
involving jihadi groups involved recruitment and radicalization on a massive, societal-level scale.  
 The Arab Spring also coincided with an outgrowth of social media usage in the Middle 
East and North Africa.20 Although much of the attention was given to Twitter, apps like Facebook 
and WhatsApp remain the social media options of choice for young people in the Middle East. 
WhatsApp and similar apps have been a particularly crucial part of the evolution of radicalization, 
                                                          
18 Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, "Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The 
Persistence of a Failed Discourse," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 86, no. 4 
(2010): 889-901. 
19 NPR Staff, “The Arab Spring: A Year Of Revolution,” NPR, December 17, 2011, accessed April 2, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution.  
20 Damian Radcliffe, “Five years after the Arab Spring, how does the Middle East use social media?” The 




as they allow for encrypted text conversations between users in different countries. The Syrian 
Civil War served as the first prominent example of Islamist groups recruiting foreign fighters to 
their cause through these messaging apps.21 In the years before during the Arab Spring protests, 
social media primarily functioned as a tool for a country’s citizens to organize resistance groups 
and spread information. As the Syrian Civil War drug on, however, Islamist groups (who were 
often comprised of foreigners themselves) began to actively reach out to foreign Muslims to bolster 
recruitment, mirroring earlier conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.  
 The formation of the Islamic State in 2014 further altered the jihadi landscape by crafting 
a message designed to appeal to all Sunni Muslims, rather than targeting fighters and jihadi 
veterans specifically. Whereas Islamist groups in the Syrian Civil War were fighting against the 
Syrian government in a bid for dominance within the country, the Islamic State claimed large 
swaths of territory as its own. Thus, the appeal to foreigners was not a call to fight against an 
oppressive regime, but for Muslims to come live in a like-minded society.22 Would-be jihadis in 
the previous two decades were limited in their ability to physically interact with or join al Qaeda, 
which is one of the primary reasons that literature on radicalization often focused on groups and 
macro-level trends. Unlike al Qaeda, which operated as a geographically nebulous group of cells, 
the Islamic State utilized its tangible territorial gains to bring in a much broader swath of Muslim 
men and women from around the world.23 
                                                          
21 Sandra Laville, “Social media used to recruit new wave of British jihadis in Syria,” Guardian, April 15, 2014, 
accessed April 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/social-media-recruit-british-jihadis-
syria-twitter-facebook.  
22 David Ignatius, “How ISIS Spread in the Middle East,” Atlantic, October 29, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/.  




 Following the Islamic State’s rise, radicalization-related academic literature began to focus 
increasingly on Europe and European Muslims.24 Discourse began to shift, as the Islamic State’s 
ranks were bolstered by young Muslims who had been living as minorities outside their ethnic 
region of origin. Research sought to explain why young people who were born in European 
countries and often did not speak Arabic or know the Quran began to join an international terrorist 
organization in such large numbers.25 This research is informative, but often times the literature 
seems to be playing catch-up with ongoing sociological and geopolitical issues. This is not an 
entirely new trend- much of the new research on radicalization of young European Muslims has 
data that shows that Muslim minorities in Europe have felt increasingly marginalized in the years 
following 9/11 and the War on Terror.26 Unfortunately, research into why this marginalization was 
taking place is lacking. Only after thousands of of would-be jihadis left Europe for the Islamic 
State, however, has there been a broader attempt to explore these problems in great detail. 
 The Islamic State’s aggressive use of new technologies in its propaganda and recruitment 
efforts have also warranted increased scrutiny. Over the last few years, research on radicalization 
has attempted to explore the roles that technology has played in convincing young Muslims 
(especially Europeans) to swear allegiance to the Islamic State and other radical groups.27 Unlike 
al Qaeda, whose propaganda relied on broad public messaging, Islamic State recruiters are able to 
reach out (or be reached out to) directly to internet and mobile phone users. Some authors have 
argued that these technological advances have fundamentally changed the nature of radicalization, 
                                                          
24 Angela Rabasa and Cheryl Bernard, Eurojihad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 41. 
25 Carolin Goerzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi, Radicalization in Western Europe (New York: Routledge, 2015).  
26 “Migrants and Their Descendants: Guide to policies for the well-being of all in pluralist societies,” Council of 
Europe, December 2010, accessed 5/1/2018, 
https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/GUIDEMIGRANTS_EN.pdf.  
27 Karen J. Greenberg, “Counter-Radicalization via the Internet,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 668, no. 1 (2016) 165. 
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as the Islamic State became a vessel for career criminals and disaffected youth.28 French political 
scientist Olivier Roy has coined “Islamization of radicalism,” suggesting that radical (i.e. criminal) 
behavior has taken on an increasingly Islamic nature, rather than Islam becoming more 
“radicalized.”29 Academic literature on digital recruitment and counter radicalization also has an 
added use of providing strategies and understanding for law enforcement and policymakers 
engaged in combatting Islamic State recruitment.30 Broad, big-picture analysis regarding 
radicalization trends is important, but is at times hamstrung by its lack of applicability and policy 
recommendations.  
 
SECTION TWO: RADICALIZATION IN RUSSIA 
 Within the Russian Federation, the Islamic radicalization process has been a government 
concern for nearly its entire existence. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a 
former Soviet Air Force General, declared Chechnya’s independence from the fledgling Russian 
Federation.31 Chechnya was a Muslim-majority territory in the North Caucasus, helping form 
Russia’s border with Georgia. Tensions between the breakaway Chechen Republic and Russia 
simmered for several years before culminating in the Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 
1994. For Russia, Dudayev’s resistance harkened back to decades of Chechen resistance in the 
middle of the 19th century. In that conflict, known as the Murid War, Chechen and Dagestani 
resistance fighters gathered around a charismatic Islamic scholar named Imam Shamil. Shamil’s 
                                                          
28 Paul Kombo, “Radicalization as a Functional Aspect of Crime,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 6 
(2017), 163-170. 
29 Isaac Chotiner, “The Islamization of Radicalism,” Slate, June 22, 2016, accessed March 11, 2018, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/06/olivier_roy_on_isis_brexit_orlando_and
_the_islamization_of_radicalism.html.  
30 Sarah McNicol, “Responding to Concerns About Online Radicalization in U.K. Schools Through a Radicalization 
Critical Digital Literacy Approach,” Computers in the Schools 33, no. 4 (2016), 227-238. 
31 Lee Hockstader, “Russia Pours Troops Into Breakaway Region,” Washington Post, December 12, 1994, accessed 
March 11, 2018, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/stories/chechnya121294.htm.  
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influence on the region was profound, as he turned a fight that was initially about resisting 
imperialist invaders into an Islamic jihad.32 
 More than 150 years after the Murid War, Dudayev evoked Shamil’s name as a rallying 
cry against the Russian Federation. Dudayev, who by many accounts had only been nominally 
religious prior to his assent to power, declared the Chechen-Russian conflict a holy war.33 
Dudayev’s cooption of Islam as a rallying mechanism would have profound effects on the Chechen 
conflict. Over the course of the first Chechen War, a number of Arab Muslim fighters poured into 
the region to assist the Chechens in their jihad.34 Many of these fighters had been radicalized in 
the Afghan-Soviet War and had now returned to once again fight against perceived Russian 
imperialism.  
 Initial research into the Chechen wars sought to contextualize Chechen’s armed struggle 
against Russia, characterizing the conflict as the oppressor vs. the oppressed.35 In the Soviet period, 
Josef Stalin ordered the entire Chechen population deported to Kazakhstan in retaliation to what 
he perceived as collaboration with the Nazis. In the process of deportation and exile, more than a 
hundred thousand Chechens perished – well over a quarter of the population.36Early research 
highlighted the historical grievances of the Chechen population, with Islamic fundamentalism as 
a secondary reason for the outbreak of violence.37 Over the course of the First Chechen War (1994-
                                                          
32 John Frederick Baddely, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, (London: Longman’s, Green and Co., 1908): 242. 
33 James Meek and Francisco Herranz, “Dudayev Threatens Holy War,” Guardian, August 12, 1994, accessed March 
11, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/aug/12/chechnya.jamesmeek.  
34 “Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab,” BBC News, April 26, 2002, accessed March 11, 2018, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1952053.stm.  
35 John B. Dunlop, Russia confronts Chechnya : roots of a separatist conflict, (Cambridge, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
36 “1944-1957: Deportation and Exile,” Telegraph, January 1, 2001, accessed March 11, 2018, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399561/1944-1957-Deportation-and-exile.html.  
37 Thomas de Waal, “Greetings from Grozny. Fighting for Chechnya: Is Islam a Factor?” PBS, July 25, 2002, accessed 




1996), Chechen forces carried out several terror attacks against Russia, but their methods more 
closely resembled the 1970s hijackings of the PLO – hostage-taking for the purpose of political 
gain – than the indiscriminate violence of al Qaeda.38 
 Following Dudayev’s assassination in 1996, Russia and Chechnya signed peace accords 
that temporarily ended the conflict. In the interwar period, many of the foreign jihadis remained in 
the region and began to garner considerable influence amongst the local population. Most 
prominent examples include Ibn al-Khattab and Abu al-Walid, mercenaries and warlords of Saudi 
origin. Much of the research into violent extremism in Chechnya has highlighted this time period 
as a key time period for Russia’s national security, as Chechnya began to endure an internal 
struggle between Sufi Muslims and Salafis.39 Sufism had been the dominant form of Islam in 
Chechnya for most of its history, but many of the foreign fighters that had come to fight in the 
First Chechen War claimed adherence to Salafism. The Salafis (or Wahabbis, as they are 
sometimes referred) adopted a more traditional and hardline stance in terms of religious 
practices.40 By the outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999, many of the most powerful 
Chechen warlords had adopted Salafism as their new religious code, bringing their belief system 
more into line with Arab terror groups like al Qaeda. Although the change in religious tone has 
been covered by numerous researchers, research into why individual Chechens would gravitate 
towards a more hardline religious movement has been limited.  
                                                          
38 Elena Pokolova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus, (Santa 
Barbara, California: Praeger, 2015), 46.  
39 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2007), 98. 




 Researchers have noted that this religious change portended a shift in the nature of Chechen 
jihad, though some have argued that the influence of foreign fighters has been overstated.41 
Although the true extent of foreign influence in Chechnya remains in contention, the renewed 
conflict in 1999 did mark a clear change in Chechen terror tactics. Chechen fighters began to 
orchestrate mass casualty terror attacks across the country, including apartment bombings in 1999 
and a 2002 theater siege that drew considerable international attention. As the targets for these 
terror attacks shifted from in and around Chechnya to major Russian cities, so too did international 
perception of Chechen militants. After Chechen suicide bombers downed two Russian airliners in 
2003, Chechen rebels became firmly characterized as radical Islamic terrorists – rather than 
fighters for independence – by both the international community and researchers alike.42 After 
2004, the frequency and scale of Chechen-orchestrated terror attacks began to subside. In the years 
that followed, a considerable amount of research was done regarding the Russian government’s 
strategy to coopt some Chechen groups as state-sponsored proxies.43 Writers have noted that the 
Russian government’s official rhetoric sought to differentiate moderate Sufis and Salafis, with the 
latter being explicitly associated with foreign influence.44  
 The Kremlin’s tactics appear to have worked: following the appointment of former 
Chechen rebel and Sufi mufti Akhmad Kadyrov as Chechen President in 2004, many Chechens 
began to side with the government-aligned Chechen faction against more radical rebel groups. By 
2006, major fighting had subsided, and the Russian Federation declared the Second Chechen War 
                                                          
41 Roland Dannreuther, "Islamic Radicalization in Russia: An Assessment," International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-) 86, no. 1 (2010): 115. 
42 Cerwyn Moore, “Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom,” Europe-Asia Studies 64, no. 9 
(2012): 1800. 
43 Tom Parfitt, “The battle for the soul of Chechnya,” Guardian.  
44 Oleg Yegorov, “Building bridges: Russia encourages traditional Islam to combat extremism,” Russia Beyond the 




officially over in 2009. Although sporadic terror attacks continued in the years that followed, the 
specter of Chechen radicalization temporarily subsided. As the threat of violence from Chechnya 
decreased, so too did the academic literature regarding Chechnya and Chechen radicalization.45 
As the region became less restive, researchers instead began looking into the successful 
components of the Russian strategy in Chechnya.4647 While the number of Chechen rebels may 
have diminished, feelings of discontent and a desire to fight lingered in the region, eventually 
culminating in a declaration of an Islamic State-affiliated caliphate in Chechnya.48 
 The declaration of the Islamic State fundamentally altered terrorism and radicalization 
concerns in Russia.49 Despite lower levels of insurgent violence in the North Caucasus in recent 
years, Russia nevertheless has been one of the largest suppliers of foreign fighters in Iraq and 
Syria.50 Research shows that Caucasians bolstering the ranks of the Islamic State are not just 
veterans of the two Chechen wars: like in Western Europe, a considerable number of young 
Russian Muslims have left their homes, citing a combination of lack of opportunities and a stifling 
local security situation.51 In response, Kadyrov’s security forces have begun cracking down on 
those perceived as Salafists, though hard data regarding the scope of these crackdowns is 
incredibly difficult to come by. Given the authoritarian nature of the Chechen (and Russian) 
                                                          
45 A University of Texas Library online search with of the words “Chechnya” and “radicalization” together shows a 
nearly 30% decrease in results (1,492 to 1,054) from 2011-2017 when compared to 2004-2010. 
46 Roland Dannreuther and Luke March, “Chechnya: Has Moscow Won?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 50, 
no. 4 (2008): 97-112. 
47 John Russell, “Kadyrov's Chechnya—Template, Test or Trouble for Russia's Regional Policy?” Europe-Asia 
Studies63, no. 3 (2011): 509-528. 
48 “Six North Caucasus Insurgency Commanders Transfer Allegiance To Islamic State,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, January 2, 2015, accessed March 18, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-north-caucasus-
insurgency-commanders-allegiance/26773615.html.  
49 Leon Aron, “The Coming of the Russian Jihad: Part I,” War on the Rocks, September 23, 2016, accessed March 
19, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/.  
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government and the restrictions placed on the Russian press, academic research regarding driving 
factors behind Chechen radicalization remains limited. Adding further complications, Chechen 
jihadis are often drawn from two distinct groups – hardline rebels and marginalized youths – which 
means that research on Chechen radicalization is in fact covering two different phenomena.  
Although limited in their ability to investigate micro elements of Chechen radicalization, 
Western news media outlets have repeatedly covered the dangers of the Islamic State’s appeal in 
Russia.52 Much of the discourse regarding the Islamic State’s Russian-speaking population centers 
around the dangers of jihadis returning to their homeland.53 In addition to Russian citizens fighting 
in Iraq and Syria, concerns also lie with the sizable number of Central Asians who have declared 
allegiance to the Islamic State. Russia and the former Soviet states in Central Asia do not have 
visa restrictions, meaning that returning Central Asian jihadis could also wind up in Russia. In 
2017, two separate terror attacks perpetrated by ethnic Central Asians in Saint Petersburg left more 
than 80 injured.  As the Islamic State collapses and more fighters return home, the issue of Islamic 
State-inspired terrorism inside Russia remains a key concern for the Kremlin.  
 
SECTION THREE: RADICALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 Although Islamic radicalization is an ongoing problem throughout Central Asia, this paper 
will examine the cases of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, specifically. Unlike Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan experienced an armed Islamic 
militancy in the 1990s. Uzbek and Tajik migrants also represent two of the largest populations of 
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seasonal workers in Russia (nearly two million Uzbeks and one million Tajiks).5455 These factors 
have contributed to the large number of ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks that have been radicalized in 
Russia and have left to fight for the Islamic State. While the Islamic State may be on the ropes in 
Syria, IS offshoots continue to thrive. Perhaps most prominent among these offshoots is the Islamic 
State-Khorosan Province, which operates in Eastern and Northern Afghanistan.  
  In comparison to Western Europe and Russia, there has been significantly less research 
done on Islam and radicalism in Central Asia.56 Much of this can be attributed to Central Asia’s 
relative geographic and cultural isolation from the West; the United States would likely have little 
geopolitical interest in the region had the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan not occurred. Before the 
September 11th attacks, the scant academic literature on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan focused on 
Tajikistan’s five-year civil war, in which Islamic opposition sought to overthrow the secular 
government.57 Following the initiation of the War on Terror, however, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
sought to position themselves as allies of the United States against radical Islamic terror 
organizations. In the decade that followed, more Western research began to trickle out regarding 
the security situation in Central Asia, primarily focused on the potential terror threat emanating 
from the region.58 When discussing Central Asian security, much of the literature centers on the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (or IMU), a terror organization allied with the Taliban and later, 
the Islamic State. The IMU operates in the border region between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, 
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and although the organization has an ostensibly anti-Uzbekistan agenda, many scholars have 
stressed concerns about IMU attacks causing further problems for the US military in 
Afghanistan.59 
 For many years following 9/11, Tajikistan was generally discussed in academic literature 
within the context of security threats to Afghanistan. These discussions were often limited, 
however, by placing Tajikistan within broader research into Central Asian security. Although all 
five Central Asian countries share common security concerns, and contextualizing them in a 
regional focus is important, security studies research has often lacked depth regarding Tajikistan, 
specifically. This lack of focus can be attributed somewhat to Tajikistan’s obscurity; Tajikistan is 
one of the most repressive and poorest countries in the world.6061 These issues also highlight the 
Tajik population’s risk of radicalization, especially abroad. Tajikistan’s dire economic straits have 
drive much of its working population elsewhere, and the government has difficulty keeping track 
of who goes where.62 
 The security risks associated with having a large portion of one’s male population 
unaccounted for have been exacerbated by the creation of the Islamic State, as thousands of Uzbeks 
and Tajiks already working abroad have now moved to Iraq and Syria.63 In recent years, more 
significant research has finally begun to come out tackling issues related to radicalization of 
Central Asians (and more specifically, Uzbeks and Tajiks).64 Much of this new literature rightly 
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criticizes the earlier oversimplification of the security situation in the region, and instead focuses 
on the combination of push-pull factors exhibited by authoritarian Central Asian governments and 
the Islamic State.65 As the Uzbek and Tajik governments have repeatedly cracked down on 
organized Islam – especially more conservative versions of Islam – the Islamic State has offered 
many Central Asians opportunities elsewhere.  
 Today, academic literature on the region often discusses the issue of counter-radicalization 
and the problems of fighters returning back to their home countries in Central Asia.66 Tajik 
members of the Islamic State have previously declared their desire to “wage jihad” against their 
homeland, and the Tajik government has responded to security threats by further restricting Islamic 
practices in public.67 While some authors have pointed to restrictive governments as a trigger for 
radicalization in the region, other scholars argue that dwindling opportunities for work in Russia, 
combined with problems of poverty and a lack of education, are driving Uzbeks and Tajiks into 
the arms of the Islamic State.68 In this case, both sides appear correct in their analysis. The 
economic and political situation in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, combined with the prevalence of 
migrant labor, leaves Uzbeks and Tajiks uniquely vulnerable to radicalization efforts. Academic 
literature in the West is only now beginning to focus on this problem, but the continued threat of 
terror attacks carried out by Central Asians suggests that studies into the nature of radicalization 
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in the region will continue. The next chapter will discuss the specific circumstances and push 




















Chapter Two:  Push/Pull Factors in Migrant Radicalization 
SECTION ONE: CENTRAL ASIAN AUTOCRACIES AS AN INSULATOR FROM RADICALIZATION 
 In contrast to Chechnya, Central Asians did not have a problematic relationship with 
Russia. Although the Uzbek SSR endured a series of Stalinist purges in the 1930s, the region 
remained relatively calm through Soviet period. Although Soviet Uzbeks and Tajiks were 
overwhelmingly concentrated in their titular and neighboring SSRs, they were nonetheless full 
Soviet citizens and enjoyed the welfare state that the Soviet Union provided.69 This all changed in 
1992, however, as Post-Soviet Uzbeks and Tajiks suddenly transitioned from living in a 
moderately wealthy country to two of the world’s poorest by GDP per capita.7071  
Newly independent and incredibly impoverished, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan very quickly 
slid back into authoritarian government systems reminiscent of Soviet totalitarian control.72 As the 
new dictators began to consolidate their power in the decade following independence, localized 
Islamic militancies pushed these countries further into instability and provided an impetus for 
increased government control. Although it appears that the economic situation has rebounded 
somewhat in Uzbekistan, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was quoted in December of 2017 
saying that official statistics regarding employment and economic growth had been “fiction” for 
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years.73 Both countries remain outside the top 120 in the world by GDP per capita, leaving their 
population to search elsewhere for profitable work.7475 
 Like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Russia also experienced an economic downturn and 
significant security issues through the 1990s. As highlighted earlier in this paper, Russia’s security 
situation began to improve significantly by the mid-2000s, which also coincided with a sharp 
increase in economic growth.76 As the price of oil steadily rose, the Russian economy surged along 
with it, leading to a growth of new jobs and an influx of migrant workers. Facing an uncertain 
economic future at home, more and more Tajiks and Uzbeks began to travel to Russia in search of 
seasonal work.77  
In addition to its growing economy, Russia was an ideal destination for many Central 
Asians due to the visa-free regime established between the Russian Federation and all five Central 
Asian countries. Although the population of Central Asian migrants in Russia today is down 
slightly from its peak in 2013, more than two million Uzbeks and Tajiks continue to travel to 
Russia for economic opportunities. Geographically and politically isolated, migrants from 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have few other options. 
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 In contrast, far fewer Turkmen and Kazakh nationals work as migrant laborers in Russia. 
Kazakhstan is a relatively rich country in the region, whose growing economy still requires many 
unskilled labor jobs. Turkmen citizens, meanwhile, are not afforded visa-free travel to Russia, and 
thus often seek employment abroad in other countries like Turkey instead.78 Kyrgyzstan, like 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, has a significant number of migrant laborers in Russia. However, 
Kyrgyzstan has a more open society than its two southern neighbors – though its democratic norms 
have begun backsliding in recent years – and has exported less jihadis to the Islamic State than 
Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.7980 In the face of ongoing economic stagnation, the Tajik and Uzbek 
governments have begun to exert increasingly tighter control on their respective populations in an 
effort to prevent discontent from bubbling over. Both regimes have attempted to coopt Islam as a 
mechanism of control: by regulating which elements of Islam are officially sanctioned, the 
government can keep a close eye on potential Islamic radicalization.  
Uzbekistan, which has the largest Muslim population in Central Asia, has favored a targeted 
and less broad approach to combatting radicalization.81 The former president, Islam Karimov, 
sought to establish an official, government-endorsed form of Islam that drew upon shared Uzbek 
history and culture. Meanwhile, all Islamic political groups not under his control were banned and 
imams that did not adopt the official party line were labeled “Wahhabis” and arrested.82 In 
coordination with the newly-created Muslim Spiritual Board, which operated at the national level 
                                                          
78 “Turkey a Magnet for Migrant Workers,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 18, 2006, accessed 
April 1, 2018, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/turkey-magnet-migrant-workers.  
79 Agnieszka Pikulicska-Wilczewska, “Islamic State in Kyrgyzstan: a real or imagined threat?,” openDemocracy, 
October 1, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/agnieszka-pikulicka-
wilczewska/islamic-state-in-kyrgyzstan-real-or-imagined-threat.  
80 Charlie Winter, “War by Suicide,” International Centre for Counterterrorism – the Hague, February 2017, 21. 
81 Alexey Malashenko, "Russia and Islam in Central Asia: Problems of Migration," In The Fight for Influence: Russia 
in Central Asia, 77, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. 
82 “Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan,” Human Rights Watch, March 2004, 
accessed April 2, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/3.htm.  
23 
 
and served to tout Karimov’s agenda, the Uzbek government created neighborhood-level Islamic 
groups to monitor locals for possible dissent. Over time, all public Islamic dissent was eliminated, 
thus paving the way for state-controlled Islam to serve as a propaganda tool for the Uzbek 
government.  
Tajikistan, meanwhile, has taken an even more heavy-handed approach to combatting Islamic 
radicalization. Faced with an armed Islamic insurgency in the eastern part of the country and a 
weak military, Tajik president Emomali Rahmon has enacted increasingly draconian laws aimed 
at suppressing all forms of “untraditional” Islam.83 Meanwhile, Rahmon has also taken steps to 
legitimize his status as a Muslim, including dropping the Russian-style “ov” from his last name 
and officially banning Slavic suffixes for newborns.84 Despite these overtures to the Muslim 
community, Rahmon’s crackdown on Islam in the country is seen as an effort to secularize society 
in order to counter extremism.85  
Like Uzbekistan, the Tajik government treats Islam as a useful tool as long as the state 
maintains absolute control.86 Given the authoritarian nature of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both 
governments fear Islamic radicalization as a means of destabilizing their respective countries. The 
level of control both governments are able to exert on their populace has marginalized organized 
Islamist groups and pushed these groups into neighboring Afghanistan, thereby minimizing the 
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opportunities for localized radicalization at home.87 In contrast, the Russian state has to contend 
with migration inflows, and while the vast majority of migrants to Russia do not arrive already 
radicalized, the enhanced risk of radicalization effectively acts as mechanism to export potential 
terrorists from Central Asia to Russia. Unlike the Uzbek and Tajik governments, Vladimir Putin 
must also balance security concerns with domestic public opinion. 
 The Russian public’s perceptions of various Muslim groups residing in the Russian 
Federation are varied and complex. Given Russia’s recent history of Islamic terror attacks at the 
hands of Chechen insurgents, it is unsurprising that the majority of Russian citizens hold negative 
views of people from the North Caucasus. In contrast, the Russian republics of Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan have large Muslim populations, but ethnic Tatars and Bashkirs appear to have 
assimilated into Russian society more so than their Caucasian counterparts, and inter-ethnic 
marriages are not uncommon.8889 Additionally, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have two of the higher 
GDPs per capita among Russian federal subjects, minimizing internal migration to larger Russian 
cities in search of economic opportunities.90 A 2013 survey stated that nearly 2/3 of Muscovites 
polled would characterize Russia as “a mix of Asian and European civilizations,” indicating that 
many Russians perceive Muslim and Asiatic Russian nationals as fellow countrymen and peers.91 
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 Russian perceptions of foreign Muslim groups are far more negative. Data from the Russia-
based Levada Center reveals that public feelings towards migrant workers vary by country of 
origin: Ukrainians and ethnic Russians from the Baltic states are viewed somewhat positively, 
while migrants from Central Asia are viewed almost as negatively as Chechens and Dagestanis.92 
In Russia, migrants from Central Asia are often blamed for crime spikes and other societal 
maladies. These biases are not limited to the general population; in 2015, Moscow’s Chief 
Prosecutor stated, “If you create a ranking of criminality, you will find citizens of Uzbekistan at 
the top… next is Tajikistan…”93 With few economic opportunities at home, however, many 
Central Asian workers continue to travel to Russia for work despite Russian anti-migrant biases. 
Once in Russia, migrants are inclined to keep their heads down and limit contact with Russian 
nationals, often coalescing in migrant-oriented housing towards the outskirts of large towns.94 
Nonetheless, migrants are often the target of violence from hate groups in Russia, and data shows 
that racially motivated killings in Russia have disproportionately targeted Central Asians.95  
 As public anti-migrant sentiment has crystallized over the last decade and a half, so too has 
official Russian policy towards visiting Central Asians. The Russian government has steadily 
implemented new laws and controls aimed at stemming the flow of migrants northward into 
Russia, making it more difficult to obtain official work permits. Russia now has an electronic 
system set up to deny entry to foreigners who have committed two or more administrative offenses 
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over a short period.96 This system adds further pressure to migrants once inside Russia, with 
foreign workers under increased pressure to pay bribes to avoid arrest. reports suggest that local 
police often target migrant communities with arbitrary searches and drummed up charges.97 
 Russian concerns regarding Central Asian immigration have reached the highest levels of 
government as well, as Vladimir Putin has publicly stated that curbing “illegal immigration” is a 
priority for the Russian government.98 Visa-free travel to Russia is enticing for many Central Asian 
workers, but increased difficulties in obtaining official work permits have led many to take their 
chances with security services. In 2010, Russia’s Federal Migration Services estimated that there 
were three million people working illegally in Russia; by 2014, that number had increased to more 
than four million.99100 Ostracized from society and persecuted by Russian authorities, Central 
Asian migrants working in Russia struggle to assimilate and often live in fear of deportation. As 
research described in the previous chapter indicates, marginalized Muslim populations face a 
higher risk of radicalization and are often targeted by terror groups. The confluence of economic 
hardship and xenophobic discrimination has left Uzbeks and Tajiks working in Russia particularly 
vulnerable to Islamic radicalization. 
 
                                                          
96 Bradley Jardine, “For Russia's Labor Migrants, a Life on the Edge,” Moscow Times, November 4, 2016, accessed 
April 1, 2018, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/for-labor-migrants-a-life-on-the-edge-56018.  
97 Arman Kaliyev, “Future in Russia 'dim', say Central Asian migrants,” Caravanserai, December 13, 2017, accessed 
April 1, 2018, http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/12/13/feature-02.  
98 Vladimir Putin, “News conference of Vladimir Putin,” President of Russia, December 20, 2012, accessed April 1, 
2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173.  
99 “ФМС: в РФ нелегально работают 3 млн трудовых мигрантов, остальные 4 млн "халтурят" с налогами,” 
NEWSru, November 23, 2010, accessed April 1, 2018, https://www.newsru.com/russia/23nov2010/migranty.html.  
100 “Over 4 Million Immigrants Live in Russia Illegally, Official Says,” The Moscow Times, September 23, 2014, 




SECTION TWO: RUSSIA AS AN INCUBATOR OF MIGRANT RADICALIZATION 
 As Uzbek and Tajik migrants continue to suffer from harsh treatment and racism, they have 
increasingly turned to Islam and the mosque for literal and figurative refuge. In doing so, migrants 
have unwittingly placed themselves at a higher risk of radicalization by virtue of increased 
proximity to Islamic State recruiters. The issue of jihadi recruiters finding and radicalizing 
downtrodden and marginalized migrants at mosque is especially problematic for Russia’s Federal 
Security Service, given the practical limitations of monitoring the millions of Central Asian 
migrant workers operating in Russia. This problem is exacerbated by the significant portion of 
Uzbeks and Tajiks residing in Russia illegally, as well as widespread corruption and bribery issues 
among the local police.101 
 Russian security experts have suggested that of the several thousand Uzbeks and Tajiks 
fighting in Syria, as much as 80 to 90 percent of them came from Russia, rather than their home 
countries.102 With this dynamic in mind, it is important to explore the question of why Central 
Asians are not mobilizing in significant numbers at home. As described earlier in this paper, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan operate a robust security apparatus that is able to surveil citizens at will, 
especially those that regularly attend mosque. Authoritarian controls are only a partial explanation 
of a lack of radicalization in the region, however. Tajik and Uzbek society also places a premium 
on behavior that does not draw government attention to oneself or one’s family, including even 
peaceful protesting.103 Against this backdrop, familial and societal factors often curb tendencies 
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towards radical behavior. The system of state-approved Islam in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has 
also ensured that moderate Muslim voices are prominent, and well-known clerics have publicly 
denounced the Islamic State and the idea of fighting in Syria.104 
 Free from the watchful eye of their native governments, Uzbek and Tajik migrants in 
Russia enjoy significantly more technological freedom and are unencumbered to explore their 
religiosity through social media and the internet. Migrant communities are generally not divided 
by nationality, and instead Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz coalesce together based on a shared 
identity- one that is based not just on geography and religion, but also on the collective hardship 
and discrimination that they face in Russia.105 Unlike many Western European cities, Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg – which host the majority of Central Asian migrants in Russia – do not have large 
suburbs of immigrant communities. Instead, Uzbeks and Tajiks often live together in cramped, 
dorm-style housing or tiny apartments on the outskirts of town. With no place to congregate at 
their place of residence and fearful of gathering in public areas, many migrants turn to the mosque 
to serve as a central meeting point and an opportunity to interact with like-minded individuals. The 
mosque provides Central Asians with a sense of community, comfort, and cover from persecution.  
 The allure of the mosque also provides additional opportunities for radicalization. Once in 
Russia, a migrant worker’s ethnic identity often takes a back seat to religious identity, increasing 
the chances they will interact with religious hardliners and members of extremist groups. Free 
from the media controls in their home country, many Central Asian Muslims also turn to the 
internet for further religious guidance, where they are vulnerable to Islamic State recruitment 
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efforts.106 Some researchers have also argued the Uzbek and Tajik governments’ tight controls on 
Islam have left their nationals unprepared to resist jihadis propaganda, further exacerbating the 
chances that an Uzbek and Tajik migrant could be persuaded to join the Islamic State. 
 In addition to its sizable digital footprint, the Islamic State maintains a robust stable of 
recruiters and propagandists inside Russia. In 2017, Aleksei Grishin, a security analyst and former 
Kremlin advisor, estimated that there are 300-500 active Islamic State recruiters operating in 
Moscow alone.107 According to a Tajik citizen whose brother is now a prominent member of the 
Islamic State, the majority of these recruiters are ethnic Chechens working to send Central Asians 
to Syria.108 The use of Chechens to propagate and recruit makes strategic sense for the Islamic 
State, as Chechens hold Russian citizenship and as such have an easier time navigating around 
Russia than their Central Asian counterparts. In a 2012 press conference, Vladimir Putin 
highlighted this issue in describing how young people from the North Caucasus often enroll in 
Moscow-based universities to justify their legal residence in the city.109 Once in Moscow, it can 
be very difficult for security services to keep track of ethnic Chechens, and their permanent legal 
status is unlikely to draw much scrutiny from authorities. Once in Moscow, Islamic State-aligned 
North Caucasians are able to meet marginalized Central Asian migrants organically through 
mosques, allowing recruiters to target specific individuals perceived as susceptible to 
radicalization.  
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 The tactic of selling an idealized future to potential recruits is not unique to Islamic State 
recruiters in Russia, but often the focus of the pitch is based on the economic incentive of moving 
to Syria – an element of recruitment seen less often in Western Europe.110 As more and more 
Uzbeks and Tajiks have moved to Syria, the recruitment pitch becomes somewhat easier: potential 
recruits are told that in addition to a well-paid life free from marginalization, the presence of 
thousands of their ethnic brethren ensures that they will be welcomed with open arms. Recruiters 
build trust by spending time with potential jihadis on a personal, one-on-one basis, inviting poor 
migrants to tea or a café.111 With the majority of their pay being sent home as remittances, Uzbek 
and Tajik migrants have very little disposable income. Even relatively minor indulgences like tea 
or an afternoon of conversation in a nice apartment can be enough for Islamic State recruiters to 
earn the trust of migrant workers. Once this trust is established, recruiters are able to tailor 
messaging to each individual, depending on a potential recruit’s level of poverty, Islamic fervor, 
and feelings of ostracization.112 
 The Islamic State’s personalized recruitment strategies in Russia illuminates a sobering 
aspect of Islamic radicalization: international terror groups have become advanced enough in their 
recruiting to tailor the nature and the content of recruitment pitches based on the constraints of 
individual states or societies. Rather than rely on internet propaganda to draw in disaffected youth, 
as is often the case in Western Europe, or radical imams that proselytize hardline ideology to large 
groups, as seen in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Islamic State in Russia has instead focused on 
direct interaction to win over potential recruits. Although the Islamic State has suffered serious 
setbacks in recent months and no longer holds significant territory, the malleable nature of modern 
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terror recruitment is unlikely to change in the future. If terror groups can take advantage of 
marginalized groups on an ad-hoc basis, countries with populations at risk of marginalization must 
adjust their policies accordingly. To date, the Kremlin has been slow to respond to the outflow of 
migrants from Russia to Syria, instead focusing on restricting migrant population inflows and 
increasing deportation rates.113 
Over the last twenty years, Islamic radicalization in Russia has seen a seismic shift in 
recruitment strategies in response to the rise of global jihad and the Islamic State. What was once 
a localized and political conflict against the Russian state later morphed into an ideological war 
based on establishing a caliphate in the North Caucasus. As noted previously in this paper, these 
efforts largely failed. In recent years, Chechen recruiters aligned with the Islamic State have 
changed their tactics and their target audience. Violent resistance to the Russian state is not a key 
part of Central Asian identity, so efforts to radicalize migrants have utilized feelings of resentment 
in a different way: rather than suggesting that Uzbek and Tajik migrants take up arms against their 
oppressor, recruiters instead focus on the idea of a better and more purposeful life under the Islamic 
State.114  
 Although there are common themes among individuals and groups that are susceptible to 
radicalization, Central Asian migrants in Russia encounter a “perfect storm” of push and pull 
factors. Economic stagnation coupled with harsh governmental control pushes Tajiks and Uzbeks 
out of the country in search of work, while geography, economic opportunity, and political history 
naturally drives migrants into Russia. Once there, Central Asians occupy a position on the lowest 
rung of Russian society, ostracized by the Russian people and systemically oppressed by the 
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Russian government. Russia’s history of Caucasian Islamic resistance then provides a wealth of 
opportunities for disgruntled Russian nationals to coerce marginalized, nominally Muslim Uzbeks 
and Tajiks to join the Islamic State and free themselves from oppression. As more Central Asians 
leave Russia for the Islamic State and other terror organizations, the pitch becomes even more 
appealing: to come live in a world surrounded by your peers, free from marginalization. 
The next chapter will look ahead and attempt to explore how, despite the Islamic State’s 
contraction, this issue could and should remain at the forefront of Russian and Central Asian 


















Chapter Three:  Future Challenges 
SECTION ONE: IMPLICATIONS FOR TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN 
 Although the Islamic State no longer holds significant territory in Iraq and Syria, it 
continues to pose a serious security threat to the West, Russia, and the rest of the Middle East.115 
Following its territorial contraction, many security experts believe that the Islamic State will shift 
its tactics to incorporate more terror attacks abroad.116 As former residents of the Islamic State 
begin to return home in greater numbers, the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia 
all face a myriad of security and policy challenges. 
 Ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks fighting in the Islamic State have long made it clear that they 
desire an expansion of the caliphate into Central Asia. In 2016, prominent Tajik Islamic State 
commander Nusrat Nazarov publicly stated that he had asked Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al-
Baghdadi for permission to bring his followers home to wage jihad in Tajikistan.117 His request 
was apparently denied, but Nazarov’s request indicates that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’s tight 
societal controls may not be enough to prevent the organization of new terror cells comprised of 
returning Islamic State fighters. Although the domestic situation in Uzbekistan remains stable, 
Tajikistan’s internal security troubles have left the country teetering on the brink of widespread 
instability.118 Security experts have suggested that even a small number of returning Islamic State 
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fighters could utilize their training and experience as force multipliers.119 It is not difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which Tajik fighters return home through Tajikistan’s porous border, 
galvanize public discord, and set off further a localized conflict. 
A January 2018 report suggested that only a fraction of the Russian-speaking fighters in 
the Islamic State had returned to their homelands, but ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks have other options 
beyond returning to Central Asia.120 Violence and instability in neighboring Afghanistan, which 
has large Uzbek and Tajik populations of its own, has long been a cause for concern among the 
Uzbek and Tajik governments. The United States’ invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent 
strategic partnerships with Central Asian nations temporarily allayed these security concerns, but 
the formation of an Islamic State branch in Afghanistan has created new fears of Afghan instability 
spilling northward over the border.121 Despite the U.S. military’s efforts, the Islamic State-
Khorasan Province has continued to carry out widespread terror attacks in Afghanistan, as the 
group vies against the Taliban for influence among hardline Islamists.122 If IS-K can maintain its 
capabilities in northern Afghanistan, the organization could serve as a destination for Uzbek and 
Tajik fighters returning from Syria.  
As the Islamic State in Syria collapses, many of its former residents have begun to flee. 
When captured, these jihadis often claim that they only did menial labor for the Islamic State, 
rather than fighting, in an attempt to avoid punishment and perhaps eventually return to their 
                                                          
119 Thomas M. Sanderson, “From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of Central Asian Foreign 
Fighters,” Center for International and Strategic Studies, January 5, 2018, accessed April 16, 2018, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ferghana-valley-syria-and-beyond-brief-history-central-asian-foreign-fighters.  
120 Sanderson, “From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond,” Center for International and Strategic Studies.  
121 “Afghan Instability Threatens Tajikistan,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 28, 2017, accessed April 
16, 2018, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghan-instability-threatens-tajikistan.   
122 Ben Brimelow, “ISIS claimed responsibility for deadly attack on a children's charity and it shows their resilience 




homelands.123 Like the United States and Western Europe, the Uzbek and Tajik governments are 
currently grappling with how to handle returning citizens who once resided in the Islamic State. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Tajikistan has taken a soft approach to returning Tajiks who have not 
engaged in “violence” while in Syria and have expressed a desire to repent. These nonviolent 
offenders are rehabilitated and reintroduced into society without incarceration. In August 2017 the 
Tajik government announced that approximately 100 Islamic State members had returned, and that 
the government had pardoned more than half of the returnees. Pardoned returnees have also been 
utilized as tools in government-funded anti-Islamic State propaganda. As the Islamic State has lost 
territory, however, Tajik officials have warned that the government intends to draw a distinction 
between fighters escaping the collapse of the caliphate and those who have voluntarily returned 
home to repent.124 
In contrast, the Uzbek government has adopted a harsh stance against returnees. In May 
2017, Uzbek Interior Minister Abdusalam Azizov expressed disdain for Sweden’s policies 
regarding Islamic State fighters, arguing that they were “treated as refugees” rather than 
terrorists.125 Azizov’s statement is indicative of the approach Uzbekistan has taken towards Islamic 
State members: harsh punishments for returnees not only serve as a warning to Uzbek citizens 
thinking of straying from the government-approved strain of Islam, but also as a deterrent towards 
Uzbek fighters who are considering returning home.126 The government appears to believe that the 
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security situation will remain stable if Uzbek jihadis move on elsewhere, rather than returning 
home. Although this approach may seem cynical, Uzbekistan reticence to dealing with returning 
jihadis likely echoes the sentiments of European nations as well; without a clear history of a 
returnee’s behavior, European courts are unable to prosecute fighter’s specific crimes committed 
abroad.127 Faced with a similar conundrum, Uzbekistan has simply defaulted to long jail sentences, 
rather than trying to parse an individual’s behavior. 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan face further issues in reintegrating the women and children of 
the Islamic State. Over the course of 2016 and 2017, the number of women and children residing 
in the Islamic State increased at a higher rate than that of incoming fighters.128 The Islamic State’s 
territorial contraction has thus left many of these women and children in limbo. Hundreds of Uzbek 
and Tajik families currently reside in Iraqi and Kurdish-administered camps as they await possible 
repatriation.129 Although the Tajik government has made some diplomatic efforts to bring back 
orphaned Tajik children, this represents only a fraction of the families left behind in Iraq. As of 
late 2016, neither Tajikistan nor Uzbekistan had an official plan to repatriate and integrate the 
children of Islamic State fighters.130 
While suggesting that the Tajik and Uzbek governments adopt European-style repatriation 
programs may seem farfetched, the governments of Central Asia need only look northward to 
Russia for an example of how to handle the return of women and children from the Islamic State. 
                                                          
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/01/harsh-measures-keep-is-fighters-from-
returning-but-they-may-have-radicalized-them-in-the-first-place/?utm_term=.180c749783e1. 
127 Alyssa J. Rubin, “She Left France to Fight in Syria. Now She Wants to Return. But Can She?” New York Times, 
January 11, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/world/europe/emilie-konig-
france-islamic-state.html.  
128 Richard Barrett, “BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees,” Souphan Center, 
October 31, 2017, 5.   
129 “Tajik Diplomats Plan Return of Children of ISIS Fighters from Iraq,” Fergana News, January 13, 2018, accessed 
April 22, 2018, http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=3710&mode=snews.  
130 Uran Botobekov, “Central Asian Children Cast as ISIS Executioners,” The Diplomat, September 20, 2016, 
accessed April 22, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/central-asian-children-cast-as-isis-executioners/.  
37 
 
Russia has opted to place orphaned children back home with their grandparents in an effort to 
stabilize their lives and reintegrate them back into society.131 The senator in charge of the 
repatriation program, Ziyad Sabsabi, has argued that by bringing back orphaned children and 
placing them in a familiar environment, the children are more likely to avoid radicalization in the 
future. In this vein, the Uzbek and Tajik governments would be wise to account for orphaned 
Uzbek and Tajik children now, rather than leaving them adrift and at a heightened risk of 
radicalization.  
Following the election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as Uzbek president in December of 2016, 
relations between Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have slowly improved from the nadir 
of Islam Karimov’s regime.132 This improvement could create an opportunity for Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan to work together on the issue of returning jihadis, but better relations could also lead to 
unforeseen consequences. A relaxation of visa requirements between the two countries could allow 
former fighters to circumvent border crossings and return undetected. Although issues regarding 
internal migration in Central Asia are beyond the scope of this paper, policymakers in the region 
would do well to consider the full ramifications of looser borders. 
The next section of this chapter will analyze Russian concerns in the region moving 
forward.  
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SECTION TWO: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA 
 As noted previously in this paper, Russia has considerable interests in Central Asia, 
positioning itself as both an economic and military benefactor.133 As such, national security issues 
in the region are inherently Russian national security issues, albeit sometimes only tangibly. Russia 
currently maintains the 201st Miliary Base in Tajikistan, which houses nearly 7,000 troops, and in 
recent years the Kremlin has also increased military aid to Dushanbe.134 Russian spokesmen have 
repeatedly cited the presence of IS-K and the porous Tajik-Afghan border as security concerns, 
indicating that Russia lacks faith in Tajikistan to maintain its own internal security. A direct 
Russian response to outbreaks of violence in Tajikistan is more than a hypothetical: as a member 
of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Tajikistan is entitled to 
military support in the event that its internal security is threatened.135 Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has 
oscillated between CSTO membership and courting Western support. Currently, Uzbekistan is not 
a member of the CSTO, but the internal security of Uzbekistan – especially in regard to its border 
with Afghanistan – is also a key concern for Russia. With the largest population in the region and 
a common border with the other four Central Asian states and Afghanistan, any instability in 
Uzbekistan would likely resonate throughout Central Asia. 
 Moving forward, Russia’s relationship with Central Asia is likely to remain complex. 
Russia and Central Asia enjoy geographical proximity and a shared political history, but often 
Russia’s activities in the region invoke memories of its imperialist past. Central Asian autocrats, 
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especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, often find themselves bristling at Russian attempts to 
influence regional politics. On the other hand, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are poor countries with 
significant security issues, making it difficult for the Uzbek and Tajik governments to turn down 
Russian offers of military aid and economic incentives. Russia’s policy on the region can be 
summed up as keeping Central Asia needy, but not unstable.  
Central Asian states are not entirely dependent on Russia, however, as both the United 
States and China maintain military-to-military training programs in the region.136 The United 
States prioritizes stability in the region, given its commitments in neighboring Afghanistan, and 
has recently ramped up train-and-equip efforts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.137 Coupled with 
China’s economic forays into Turkmenistan and its border security programs in Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia has serious concerns over foreign powers influencing Central Asian geopolitics.138 Further 
strengthening of ties with China or the United States would cost Russia its place as a security 
guarantor, while a stagnant economy hindered by Western sanctions could see some Central Asian 
states begin to drift from Russia’s economic orbit.  
Further complicating security matters in the region is Russia’s possible support of the 
Afghan Taliban. The commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, has 
repeatedly accused Russia of funneling weapons into Taliban hands to prolong the military conflict 
in Afghanistan.139 Although the veracity of General Nicholson’s claim remains disputed, if Russia 
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is indeed supporting the Taliban, it does so while putting the security of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
at risk. Although the Taliban may initially appear to be a non-factor in the fairs of Afghanistan’s 
northern neighbors – the Taliban lacks ambitions beyond controlling the domestic affairs of 
Afghanistan – a more unstable Afghanistan will enable IS-K to continue operating with 
impunity.140  
Unlike the Taliban, IS-K presents a clear security threat to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and even 
to Russia. In addition to Russia’s position as a provider of security to the region, Russian officials 
also worry that IS-K will present opportunities for further radicalization in the North Caucasus.141 
Though some have suggested that fears of IS-K’s expansion have prompted Russia’s support of 
the Taliban, this suggests Russia views IS-K and the Taliban as perennial adversaries. Though the 
Taliban and IS-K have competing goals and have occasionally fought against one another in 
outright conflict, the two groups are not at war against one another. Any instability caused by IS-
K in Central Asia could end up costing Russia far more than they gain by supporting the Taliban. 
IS-K has directly threatened the Russian government in the past, and the Islamic State’s close ties 
with Chechens and other North Caucasian groups should make the Kremlin wary of prolonged 
Afghan instability.142 
Finally, the visa-free regime between Central Asian states and Russia (minus 
Turkmenistan) leaves room for returning Central Asian fighters to travel back up through 
Kazakhstan and into Russia. Russian officials have expressed concern regarding these returnees, 
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but Russia and Central Asia’s disparate network of rail lines makes it difficult to track individuals’ 
movements.143 The predominance of cash in economic transactions in Eurasia complicates things 
further, as returning militants can avoid a paper trail on their return to Russia. Although the FSB 
likely has a migrant watchlist of some kind, the sheer magnitude of the number of Central Asian 
migrants working legally and illegally in Russia leaves room for individuals to fall through the 
cracks. Russia has been accused of deliberately allowing radicalized migrants to leave Russia, 
prioritizing domestic terror prevention and passing the buck to other states to deal with.144 This 
strategy may have serious ramifications, both diplomatically and politically, should these fighters 
return to Russia and orchestrate future terror attacks. 
 Suggesting policy recommendations for the Russian Federation is difficult, given the 
centralized authority in the Kremlin and the democratic limitations of the Russian state. 
Nonetheless, there are realistic policy options that the Kremlin should keep in mind. Security 
cooperation with Uzbekistan, often a point of contention between the two states, would benefit 
Russia tremendously. Due to its position as the demographic and geographic center of Central 
Asia, Uzbekistan can be viewed as the lynchpin to Central Asian security. New Uzbek president 
Mirziyoyev has shown a willingness to form legitimate partnerships with his neighbors; Russia 
would be wise to pursue a similar partnership. Although the options for intelligence sharing are 
limited, it is imperative to Russian security that the Uzbek and Tajik governments keep track of 
returning jihadis. Assisting in that effort would be a pragmatic policy option that treats Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan as partners, rather than subordinates.  
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 With large Muslim populations of its own, Russia must also keep in mind domestic support 
for its activities in the Middle East. Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict rankled many 
domestic Muslim leaders, though feelings of concern appear to have largely dissipated following 
Russia’s military successes.145 Further geopolitical entanglements, including potential support for 
the Taliban and enhanced cooperation with Turkey, should be evaluated with Russia’s Muslims 
(both resident and non-resident) in mind. With large numbers of Central Asian migrants continuing 
to travel to Russia – legally or otherwise – and Central Asian instability issues likely to continue, 
the issue of Central Asians radicalizing in Russia is unlikely to abate in the near future. If Russia 
is not careful, the Kremlin could find itself facing a problem of radicalized Central Asians 










                                                          
145 Guy Chazan, “Russia’s Muslims on edge over air strikes on Syria,” Financial Times, October 13, 2015, accessed 




 The radicalization of poor and marginalized groups – Islamic or otherwise – is not a new 
phenomenon. The radicalization process for Central Asian migrants is still unique, however, as 
Uzbeks and Tajiks find themselves vulnerable to jihadi recruiters in Russia in ways that are not 
present at home nor in labor markets elsewhere in the world. The malleability of the recruitment 
pitch given to migrant workers should be cause for alarm; personalized recruitment pitches 
indicate that terror groups have further evolved in their messaging and propaganda efforts. 
Although the Islamic State has lost its territory in Syria and Iraq, the organization and its other 
branches remains a key security threat to Central Asia and Russia. The longer the patterns of 
Uzbek and Tajik recruitment in Russia continue, the greater the chances that Central Asia and its 
periphery will suffer from widespread instability. Combined with U.S. and Chinese interests in 
the region, Russian neglect of a burgeoning security problem could create serious geopolitical 
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